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some suitable person or association to act in behalf of the child." Here the parents
were notified of the proceedings concerning the child, but were not notified that the
court was appointing a guardian ad litem for the child. Two earlier cases suggest, but
do not hold, that the above section applies only when the parents are not present. State
cx rel. Raddue v. SUperior Court, 106 Wash. 619, 180 Pac. 875 (1919) ; In re Jones,
41 Wn.2d 764, 252 P.2d 284 (1953). The court here held that where the interests of
the child and of the parents conflict, the trial court may appoint a guardian. The fact
that the parents were given no notice of the appointment, if error, was held to be
harmless, since the parents were given full opportunity to be heard on their motion
to quash the appointment. The parents, in their brief, claimed that they had no knowledge of what occurred at the hearing appointing the guardian, or of the trial court's
grounds for appointing the guardian.
The court also held that while it is the express duty of the probation officer to represent the interests of the child, this duty is exercised on behalf of the state and county.
Therefore, when the county prosecutor declines to appear to represent the probation
officer, RCW 36.27.030 gives the trial court authority to appoint a special prosecutor.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Direct Support by a Father As a Defense to His Liability For
Non-Payment of Child Support Money. In the recent case of Koon
v. Koon,1 the Washington court held that a father who directly supported his two minor sons instead of paying child support money to
their mother in accordance with the provisions of a divorce decree
was not thereby discharged from liability for nonpayment of the money
to the mother. The court considered itself bound to follow the earlier
case of Bradley v. Fowler2 In that case a father who directly supported his children instead of paying child support money to their
mother was held to be in contempt. The divorce decree there in question specifically provided that the father was to pay the support money
even during those months when the children, who had been placed in
the custody of their mother, were visting with their father.
In following the Bradley case, the court distinguished the line of
cases including Ditmar v. Ditmar, State ex rel. Meins v. Superior
5 Each of those cases had held
Court,' and Gainsburg v. Garbarsky.
a father who had directly supported his children instead of paying
child support money to their mother to be free from liability for nonpayment. They were distinguished as cases involving the express or
implied consent of the mother, as parent-trustee, to payment of support money ina manner other than directly to her.
The court's holding in the Koon case is bound to add to the confusion
150 Wn.2d 577, 313 P2d 369 (1957).

230 Wn2d 609, 192 P.2d 969 (1948).
348 Wn.2d 373, 293 P.2d 759 (1956).
4 159 Wash. 277, 292 Pac. 1011 (1930).
5 157 Wash. 537, 289 Pac. 1000 (1930).
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already present with respect to the enforceability of child support
orders. It is true that in the earlier Meins and Gainsburg cases there
were facts from which it might be concluded that the mother, by failing to properly care for the children, had impliedly consented to their
direct support by the father. However, the much more recent Ditmiar
case involved no such facts. The consent pleaded by the father in that
case was an express agreement by the mother that if the father would
directly support one of the children, he would be free from his duty
to pay to the mother support money for that child. The court held
that the mother was a trustee of the support money for the benefit of
the child. As such, she could not agree on her own behalf to such a
reduction of the amount due her. However, the court went on to hold
that its jurisdiction to enforce child support orders was predicated on
the continued dependency of the child in question. Therefore, the
court reasoned, in the absence of specific provisions to the contrary,
there is a necessary implication in every divorce decree for child
support that its binding effect shall continue into the future only for
the period during which the children's dependency upon their custodian continues. Finding no such specific provision to the contrary in
the decree before it, the court held that the father, who in compliance
with the unenforceable agreement with the mother had in fact directly
supportd the child in question, had by such support terminated the
child's dependency upon the mother. The father thus was free from
liability for nonpayment of the support money to the mother.
It therefore appears that the question which the court in the Koon
case should have asked was not whether the mother had consented to
the direct support of the children by the father. Such consent, even if
present, would according to the holding in the Ditmar case have been
inoperative, unless it was the sort of implied consent apparently found
in the Meins and Gainsburg cases. Rather, the court should have
asked, in following the Bradley case, whether the decree in question
was similar to the decree in that case, in that it specifically provided
for continued payment of support money to the mother even during
those periods when the children were not in fact dependent upon their
mother because of the father's direct support.
Given such an enforceable decree, the result in the Koon case must
follow. A father's remedy in the event of his desire to directly support
his children rather than to pay support money to his former wife is
to seek modification of the decree.' However, since the primary con6

RCW 26.08.110.
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sideration involved in child support orders is the welfare of the child,
a decree should compel a father to pay support money to the mother
of the children only so long as the children are in fact dependent upon
her unless the children's welfare otherwise dictates. By the same token
a father who directly supports his children only because their mother
fails to provide a home or proper care for them, though technically a
volunteer insofar as the mother is concerned, ought not to be compelled to pay twice where the welfare of the children has been served
by the first payment.
Enforcement of a Foreign Separate Support Judgment. The case
of Perry v. Perry,' recently decided by the Washington court, represents a rather startling interpretation of the doctrine of full faith and
credit in the field of domestic relations. The court was asked by the
former wife of a Washington resident to enforce a Massachusetts
judgment for past due separate support money against her former
husband. In spite of the fact that the Massachusetts court which had
rendered the judgment had in personam jurisdiction over the husband
and had afforded him notice of the proceedings resulting in the judgment, the Washington court refused to enforce it.
This refusal was based on the fact that the husband had acquired
an ex parte Washington divorce prior to the time that the support
money in question had become due. Because the support provisions
in the divorce decree were inconsistent with the support provisions
of the Massachusetts support order upon which the judgment in
question was based, the court, relying on the recent U. S. Supreme
Court case of Estin v. Estin,2 denied full faith and credit to the judgment. Alternatively, the court held that according to the reasoning
employed by Justice Rutledge in his dissent in the U.S. Supreme
Court case of Griffin v. Griffinleven if the judgment was entitled to
full faith and credit, it was unenforceable in Washington.
In view of certain factors involved in the Estin and Griffin cases not
present in the Perry case, as will be indicated in detail in this note, it
is submitted that the Washington court in the Perry case was without
foundation for its holding with respect to the judgment in question.
Briefly, the case involved an action in Washington by the former
Mrs. Perry to enforce against Mr. Perry the latest of three judgments
1 151 Wash. Dec. 321, 318 P.2d 968 (1957).

-344 U.S. 541 (1948).
S327 U.S. 220 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
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she had recovered in Massachusetts for unpaid support money which
she claimed was due under a Massachusetts separate support decree.
This judgment, granted almost two years after Mr. Perry had obtained
his Washington divorce, consolidated the two earlier judgments and
covered as well the support money unpaid since the docketing of the
second judgment. Mr. Perry had filed a general appearance before
Massachusetts court at the time of his wife's action for separate
support. Therefore that court had continuing in personam jurisdiction
over him when it entered the judgment, in that the judgment wag
merely supplementary to the support action. He was given notice
prior to the docketing of the earlier two judgments, only the first
of which was related to support money unpaid prior to his receipt
of the Washington divorce, but he was not notified prior to the docketing of the third judgment.
The Washington court held that only so much of the consolidated
judgment as related to the first judgment covering the period prior
to the Washington divorce was enforceable in this state.
The court's refusal to enforce, for want of due process, so much
of the judgment as related to support money accruing after the second
judgment is consistent with the prevailing opinion in the Griffin case.
The holding in that case was that the appearance of a husband in a
divorce action did not dispense with the necessity for notice to him
of the docketing of a judgment for alimony arrears.
However, the Washington court's refusal to enforce so much of the
consolidated judgment as related to Mr. Perry's failure to pay support
money under the Massachusetts decree from the time of the Washington divorce until the docketing of the second judgment, even though
he had received the requisite notice prior to the docketing of that
judgment, seems erroneous. It is this refusal that is the subject of
the discussion to follow.
As has been noted, the Washington divorce was granted to Mr. Perry
ex parte. However, Mrs. Perry did file a special appearance to contest
the jurisdiction of the Washington court to grant her husband a
divorce. The divorce was granted subsequent to the issuance by
the Massachusetts court of a temporary support order on behalf of
Mrs. Perry, but prior to the entry of her final separate support decree.
The Washington decree ordered Mr. Perry to pay his former wife $50
per month for the support of their child, in contrast with the Massachusetts support order directing him to pay $203 per month for her
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own support. The Massachusetts court had knowledge of the Washington divorce, but chose to ignore it in entering the final decree and
judgments.'
Relying on Estin v. Estin,5 the Washington court first denied that
the second Massachusetts judgment was entitled to full faith and
credit, so that regardless of its validity in Massachusetts, only the
Washington divorce decree was enforceable in Washington. In the
Estin case it was held that New York was not required to give full
faith and credit to so much of a husband's ex parte Nevada divorce,
which contained no provision for alimony, as was asserted to have
terminated the rights of a New York wife to support money under a
prior New York separate maintenance decree. The Washington court
considered that case to have been decided on the following alternative
grounds: (1) that the prior New York decree had vested the wife
with a property right of which she could not be deprived except by a
court which unlike the Nevada court had in personam jurisdiction
over her, and (2) that New York had such an interest in the support
and livelihood of its domiciliary as to justify it in refusing to give
full faith and credit to the Nevada decree insofar as that decree was
contended by the husband to have terminated his former wife's right
to support. The Washington court chose to follow the second ground.
It thus interpreted the Estin case to have held that once a state had
determined its domicilary's economic needs and ability to pay, as
Washington had done in ordering Mr. Perry to pay $50 a month
to his former wife, that state was not required to give full faith and
credit to a conflicting foreign decree such as the Massachusetts order
that he pay a larger amount.
The difficulty with that line of reasoning, however, is that it assumes
that even had Mrs. Estin been personally before the Nevada court, as
Mr. Perry was before the Massachusetts court, the Supreme Court
would have permitted New York to refuse to recognize the Nevada
' The temporary order also restrained Mr. Perry from proceeding with his then
pending Washington divorce action until final determination of his wfie's separate
support action. Almost a year passed before Mr. Perry, having been unsuccessful in
his attempts to cause his wife to ask for a final hearing, notified the Massachusetts court
that he considered himself no longer bound by the temporary injunction, and proceeded
to obtain the divorce in Washington. Mrs. Perry's counsel argued before the Washington court, according to his brief, that Mr. Perry had acquired his divorce in violation of the Massachusetts court, and that therefore Massachusetts was entitled to ignore
it when it later entered the final decree and the judgments. The Washington court in
its opinion failed to discuss this argument, apparently rejecting it as having no bearing
on the question of the ability of Massachusetts to collaterally attack the Washington
divorce.

B344 U.S. 541 (1948).
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decree. Such a rule would mean the end of full faith and credit in
the area of domestic relations, in that it would permit the state of
domicile to completely disregard a foreign judgment, even though
the foreign court had personal jurisdiction over the parties before it.
Fortunately, the theory behind such a rule has gained little headway
in the Supreme Court since it was first suggested.'
However, it is apparent that the fact of Mr. Perry's personal
appearance in Massachusetts did bother the Washington court, for
the court went on to hold that even if it was required to grant full
faith and credit to the second Massachusetts judgment, that judgment
was unenforceable in Washington, in view of the reasoning employed
by Justice Rutledge in his dissent in the Griffin case.
The court found that under Massachusetts law, as indicated by
the case of Rosa v. Rosa,7 a valid divorce terminates a husband's
liability for payments of separate support which have not become
due at the time of the divorce. It also found that according to
Williamson v. Williamson, Massachusetts allows retroactive modification of support orders. Therefore the court held that the second judgment was unenforceable under Massachusetts law and thus could
not be enforced in Washington either. The court reasoned that since
the Washington divorce was valid in Massachusetts because of Mrs.
Perry's special appearance in Washington,' Mr. Perry could have
prevented the docketing of the second judgment covering support
money unpaid after the divorce if he had "actually litigated" his
defense. The court then referred to Justice Rutledge's dissenting
opinion in the Griffin case. According to the law of New York, which
had issued the judgment for alimony arrears being sued upon in
that case, the docketing of such a judgment did not preclude the
husband from later making his defense. For that reason, Justice
Rutledge had dissented from the holding of the majority of the court
that due process required notice to the husband before the docketing
6 This theory apparently originated in Justice Stone's dissent in Yarborough v.
Yarborough, 250 U.S. 202 (1933), and in addition to its appearance in the Estlin case,

it was recognized in Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Eisenwein v. Pennsylvania,
325 U.S. 279 (1945). In no case however, has this ground this ground alone been the
basis for allowing a state to deny full faith and credit to a foreign support order, much
less to a foreign judgment such as that in the Perry case.
7 296 Mass. 271, 5 N.E.2d 417 (1936).
8246 Mass. 270, 140 N.E. 799 (1923).
9 In Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948), it was held that the appearance of the
defendant spouse in a divorce action rendered res judicata the question of the court's

jurisdiction to grant the divorce, so that the state of domicile of that spouse could not
later collaterally attack the decree on the ground that the plaintiff spouse w-as not
domiciled within the state granting the divorce. See also footnote 4, supra.
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of the judgment. From this, the Washington court concluded that
even though Mr. Perry was notified before the docketing of the second
judgment in Massachusetts, he could still raise the Washington divorce
as a defense to the enforcement of that judgment in Massachusetts.
Therefore, according to the doctrine of full faith and credit the defense
was also available to him in Washington.
It would seem that this reasoning is open to the following objections:
(1) Justice Rutledge in the Griffin case was applying New York law
with respect to the right of a defendant to raise a defense to a judgment for alimony arrears after docketing of the judgment. It does
not appear that Massachusetts allows the same right. In fact the
Williamson case, cited by the court as authority for the proposition
that retroactive modification of a support decree was available in
Massachusetts, involved modifiication before, not after, the arrears
had been reduced to a judgment.
(2) Suppose, however, that Massachusetts would allow Mr. Perry
to raise a defense after docketing of the judgment. By virtue of the
doctrine of res judicata, it would appear that such an allowance ought
only to apply to a defense which was not raised prior to the judgment
because of a failure to notify the defendant of the proceedings. But
Mr. Perry was notified in advance of the docketing of the second judgment, and simply failed to take advantage of the opportunity to
litigate the defense which he subsequently presented to the Washington
court. Therefore, only if Massachusetts, in addition to allowing
retroactive modification of its decree after the arrears due under that
decree had been reduced to a judgment, would also have allowed Mr.
Perry to contest the execution of that judgment in spite of his failure
to take advantage of his opportunity to raise his defense before docketing, could the Washington court validly accept the Washington divorce
as a defense to the enforceability of the second Massachusetts
judgment.
Therefore it is concluded that the second basis for the Washington
court's holding in the Perry case, like the first, fails to meet the test
of a critical analysis of the authorities cited. Undeniably, as Judge
Finley suggests in his interesting footnote to the opinion of this case,
there "should be some means available to protect the welfare of Washington domiciliaries, and this state's social interest therein," but it
must be apparent that the means here attempted are not satisfactory.
PHn, AuSTIN

